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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal tax law allows the owner of a “certified historic structure” to claim a
deduction for the charitable donation of a preservation easement. 1 Oftentimes, the owner
will also be able to claim a similar deduction from state income taxes. 2 Further still, the
donation might also lead to lower property taxes if the municipality consents to reappraise the property at a lower value as a result of the easement. 3 Thus, the intersection
of state and federal law may create a “tax trifecta,” which serves as a powerful economic
incentive for property owners to donate preservation easements.
This paper seeks to answer, from the vantage point of local historic preservation,
whether § 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code creates any benefits other than those
enjoyed by historic property owners in the form of income tax deductions. In other
words, what does an easement do that local preservation laws do not already do?
The paper concludes that historic property owners do typically relinquish
something of value when they donate an easement and that preservation easements can be
an effective tool to complement existing local regulation primarily because they
withstand potential change in local laws. 4 However, this paper further finds that because
the value of a donated easement may not be as great as is commonly believed, so too may
the future efficacy of this preservation tool be weaker than currently imagined.
1

I.R.C. § 170(h) (2004). See infra Part II and note 20. Furthermore, the Code uses the term “qualified
conservation contribution” rather than “preservation easement.” However, I use the latter term in this paper
to refer to a subset of “contributions”—those easements on historic properties, as opposed to, for example,
open-space easements that apply to property such as farmland.
2
See e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 42-204 (2004).
3
In Washington, D.C., while it is theoretically possible to get encumbered property re-assessed for local
property tax purposes, it is very rare if not unprecedented. Telephone Interview with Philip Appelbaum,
Senior Assessor, D.C. Real Property Tax Administration (April 6, 2004).
4
See, e.g., Robert Strauss, Official in Philly Targets Preservation Controls, W ASH. POST , Mar. 22, 2004, at
A3 (reporting on a City Council bill that would allow the Council to de-designate historic districts). For a
partisan account of how the small town of Monterey, Virginia abolished its historic district, see L.M.
Schwartz, “Precedent-Setting Victory for Property Rights: Local Historic District Abolished,” at
http://www.prfamerica.org/HistoricDistrictAbolished.html (last visited May 10, 2004).
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There are at least two main ways that legislation can serve the goals of historic
preservation: local regulation of the ilk approved in Penn Central, 5 and tax expenditures
that incentivize historic preservation efforts. 6 Each method reflects a different conception
of property. The former conceives of property as interconnected and a non-commodity
for the purposes of protecting the “commons.”7 The latter instead conceive s of property
interests that can be severed and valued as a commodity. 8
The purpose of distinguishing between these two conceptions of property, as
reflected in local regulation and in the § 170(h) tax expenditure, is twofold. First,
hopefully it helps to situate this provision of the Revenue Code in the context of historic
preservation methods. 9 Second, it highlights the consequences of characterizing a stick
from the property bundle, such as an easement, as a commodity.
Penn Central established that historic properties could be landmarked, subject to
regulation, without violating the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. 10 That case, and
regulation of property in historic districts more generally, 11 can be understood as

5

Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
I.R.C. § 170(h) (2004); I.R.C. § 47 (2004). For more on the term “tax expenditure,” see STANLEY S.
SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM : THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES 6-7 (1973).
7
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 S CIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968). I use the term
“commons” here to refer not to pasture for cattle to graze, but to that portion of a community’s architecture
that it deems worth preserving. There exists the same potential for a “tragedy of the commons” because it
may be very beneficial for the property owner to add additional stories to a building while the negative
effects on the historic quality of a neighborhood will be diffused among others in the community.
8
See M ORTON HORWITZ, The Progressive Transformation in the Conception of Property, in THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY,” 145, 149 (1992).
9
The easement movement was born prior to Penn Central and at a time when local preservation ordinances
were less firmly entrenched. For a detailed account of the legislative history of § 170(h), see Stephen J.
Small, The Tax Treatment of the Donation of Easements in Scenic and Historic Property, Envtl. L. Rep.
(Mar. 1979); STEPHEN SMALL , THE FEDERAL TAX LAW OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS (2d ed. 1990 &
Supp. 1996).
10
438 U.S. at 138.
11
See, e.g., Maher v. New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding validity of New Orleans
historic preservation ordinance as legitimate exercise of police power).
6
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expressing a non-commodity view of property in which an individual’s property rights
may be restricted for the sake of protecting the commons. 12
In contrast, the preservation easement deduction contained in § 170(h) persists in
treating as a commodity those property rights that extend beyond the current reach of
local regulation. If one conceives of the easement as going beyond what a community
has collectively decided is required for the sake of the commons, then it makes normative
sense to focus on the individual “stick” from the property bundle to arrive at a value of
compensation in the form of an income tax deduction. In contrast to Penn Central, where
the owner received no compensation because it was one of many subject to a
comprehensive plan, the owner who donates an easement does receive compensation for
going beyond what the comprehensive plan requires. For § 170(h) to maintain its
sensible normativeness, however, it is important that an easement actually reflect a
donation that is beneficial to the commons. 13
To understand how the conceptions of property are contextually dependent on a
community’s regulation of its commons, consider hypothetical owners X and Y. Each
owns an historic property, but X lives in a “weak” historic district, while Y lives in a
“strong” historic district. X might be able to successfully deduct the value of the donated
easement that imposes more stringent controls than those in his district’s ordinances,
even if the easement’s burdens are no stronger than the ordinances in Y’s district. Much
to the consternation of Y, were he to donate the same easement that X imposed, he should
clearly receive no deduction because he has not experienced a further burden. In other

12

See Joseph Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81YALE L.J. 149, 162 (1972) (“The effects
of a vast tower built on a single tract spill over visually onto other lands just as smoke or noise does.”).
13
Although the donation of an easement entails a particularized analysis of an individual property right, the
deduction is nonetheless “community-based” because it involves the expenditure of public funds.

3

words, the “stick” that X donates is no longer a stick for Y because of the more
demanding baseline that Y’s district has drawn to protect its commons. 14
Because this outer, or unregulated, realm of property interests is treated by the
Code as a commodity, an owner is likely to donate it only when it is in his economic
interest. If the value of some easements may not be as great as is commonly believed, as
this paper posits, property owners, assuming they are self- interested and not altruistic
preservationists, are more likely to retain non-regulated property interests than they
would be were the easements valued as high as is now commonly believed.
Therefore, § 170(h) is a historic preservation tool that complements local
regulation because it, for example, encourages the use of easements that last in perpetuity
whereas local regulations may change. However, the efficacy of § 170(h) is proportional
to the value ascribed to easements. Should the value of easements be lower than
currently imagined, owners will be less likely to take this additional step that would be
beneficial to the commons.

II. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY SCHEMA
Only qualified conservation contributions are eligible for deductions. 15 For the
purposes of historic structures, there needs to be (1) a qualified real property interest, (2)
donated to a qualified organization, (3) exclusively for conservation purposes. 16

14

For a lucid discussion of the significance of forms of property, see Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property,
91 CALIF. L. RE V. 1517, 1534-35 (2003) (“To know if and how the existing configuration of a property
form should affect the legal outcome, however, we must analyze the forms of property from a normative
and contextual (i.e., legal realist) perspective. The forms of property should affect outcomes to the extent
that they help constitute property institutions that serve important human values.”).
15
I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) (2004).
16
I.R.C. § 170(h)(1) (2004); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A -14 (as amended in 1999).
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First, a preservation easement counts as a “qualified real property interest” if it is
“a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of the real
property.”17 Second, qualified organizations are typically § 501(c)(3) organizations but
might instead be a state or a subdivision of a state. 18 Third, a donor will meet the
“exclusively for conservation purposes” test if the donation is for the “preservation of an
historically important land area or a certified historic structure” and is protected in
perpetuity. 19
Further to the third requirement, a certified historic structure is a structure that is
“listed in the National Register” or that is “located in a registered historic district…and is
certified by the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary [of the Treasury] as being of
historic significance to the district.”20 The Treasury Regulations impose an additional
requirement that there be “some visual public access to the donated property.”21 Most
properties in an urban environment, such as Washington, D.C. or New Orleans, meet this
requirement because the property is visible from a public way. With respect to the
“exclusively” requirement, the Treasury Regulations impose another important
requirement: a mortgagee must subordinate its rights in the property “to the right of the
qualified organization to enforce the conservation purposes of the gift in perpetuity.”22

17

I.R.C. § 170(h)(2)(C) (2004).
I.R.C. § 170(h)(3) (2004). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.170A -14(c) (as amended in 1999) (requiring that
organization have resources to enforce easement, but stating that the organization need not set aside funds
to enforce the easement).
19
I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(iv) (2004); I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(A) (2004).
20
I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(B) (2004). For the definition of “registered historic district,” see I.R.C. § 47(c)(3)(B)
(2004). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(5)(ii)(B) (as amended in 1999) (noting that “historically
important land areas” include those buildings in a historic district that “can reasonably be considered as
contributing to the significance of the district”).
21
Treas. Reg. § 170A-14(d)(5)(iv) (as amended in 1999).
22
Treas. Reg. § 170A-14(g)(2) (as amended in 1999). See also Satullo v. Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1697
(1993) (holding that donated easement was not a “qualified conservation contribution” because
mortgagee’s interest was superior to the easement holder’s, who failed to have mortgagee subordinate its
rights.)
18
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Although the Revenue Code allows for the deduction of a charitably donated
easement, it provides no guidance on how to properly value a preservation easement.
Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings clarify that the value of a preservation
easement is its fair market value; however, because there is no real market for easements,
the fair market value is derived by subtracting the value of the encumbered property after
imposing the easement from the value of the property prior to imposing the easement. 23
There are three main approaches to conducting the “before and after” valuation of
an easement: (1) comparable sales, (2) capitalized net operating income, and (3)
replacement cost. 24 The replacement cost method is often a poor method for determining
the value of historic properties, so appraisers tend to rely on the first two methods. 25
Furthermore, the income approach typically does not apply well to residential property,
which often leaves the comparable sales method the most appropriate method for
conducting the before and after valuation of residential property. 26
Whichever method is applied, the two most basic steps in the valuation process
are determining the “highest and best use” of the property (1) before the easement is
imposed and (2) after the easement is imposed. 27 For a property owner to establish that

23

Treas. Reg. § 170A-14(h)(3) (as amended in 1999) (Stating that “the fair market value of a perpetual
conservation restriction is equal to the difference between the fair market value of the property it
encumbers before the granting of the restriction and the fair market value of the encumbered property after
the granting of the restriction.”); Rev. Rul. 73-339.
24
LAND TRUST A LLIANCE , APPRAISING EASEMENTS, GUIDELINES FOR VALUATION OF LAND
CONSERVATION AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION EASEMENTS 30-33 (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter A PPRAISING
EASEMENTS]. Treasury Regulations call only for the before and after valuation method; these three specific
methods are those accepted by and used in the appraisal profession.
25
See, e.g., Dorsey v. Comm’r, 59 T.C.M. (CCH), 600 (1990) (rejecting cost approach because
reproduction or replacement of a historic property was too remote a possibility to provide a value); Losch
v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH), 915 (1988) (“However, in dealing with an older, historic structure, it is
highly questionable whether the replacement cost method can be used to provide meaningful results.”).
26
A PPRAISING EASEMENTS, supra note 24, at 30.
27
Hilborn, 85 T.C. at 689. For a visual aid, see Appendix A.
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there is a use higher and better than the current use, the owner must show such use is
reasonably probable in the near future. 28
Key to understanding whether an easement’s burden is greater than that already
imposed by local law is the requirement that local zoning and preservation laws be
considered. The Regulation calls for considering “any effect from zoning, conservation,
or historic preservation laws that already restrict the property’s potential highest and best
use.”29 Because an easement is a binding agreement between the property owner and the
donee organization, the parties have flexibility in deciding the easement’s terms. One
example of how an easement might facially go beyond the scope of local regulations is
for the easement to apply to all sides of the property. Because most local preservation
regulation applies only to what is visible from a public right-of-way, then an easement
which applies to all sides—including those portions not visible from a public right of
way—goes beyond local regulation. For example, in Washington, D.C., preservation
regulation is dramatically reduced for additions or alterations if they are done to part of
the property, such as the rear, that is not visible from a public way. 30 In contrast, an
easement might be imposed on all sides of an his toric building. 31 On its face then, the
easement will exceed the regulations’ control, but ascribing a value to that difference is a
thornier task.
28

Id.
Treas. Reg. § 170A-14(h)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1999); see also S. Rep. 96-1007, 15 (“Where applicable,
valuation of the property before contribution should take into account zoning, conservation, or historic
preservation laws that would restrict development of the property.”).
30
Although the Washington, D.C. statute and regulations do not expressly limit the review of alterations or
additions to visible portions, compare D.C. CODE A NN. § 6-1101-1107 (2004) and D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 10,
§ 2505-2510 (2004) with the Historic Preservation Design Guidelines, promulgated by the Historic
Preservation Review Board, entitled “Additions to Historic Buildings,” 8, 11 available at
http://planning.dc.gov/planning/frames.asp?doc=/planning/LIB/planning/preservation/pdf/000015b4.pdf
(last visited May 10, 2004). It is unusual for a municipality to have control over “all four walls.”
31
See, e.g., the easements of L’Enfant Trust, available at http://www.lenfant.org/2004deed.doc (April,
2004), and Foundation for the Preservation of Historic Georgetown, available at
http://preservegeorgetown.org/document.htm (2004).
29
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III. WHAT THE OWNER GIVES UP: ACCOUNTING FOR LOCAL LAW
Do property-owners in historic districts give up anything when they donate
preservation easements, or, given that these owners already face local preservation and
zoning ordinances, is the donation an empty, tax- motivated gesture? The approximately
six cases on point establish that, notwithstanding local preservation laws, these owners do
give up something additional—for example, the right to higher rental income or the right
to make additions that would have otherwise been approved. 32 A review of the caselaw is
helpful to understanding what owners give up but also highlights concerns that the typical
value of a donated easement may not be as great as is commonly believed. 33 As a result, a
lower value for easements may weaken this alternative method of historic preservation.
As a result of imposing a preservation easement, the property owners in each of
the six cases experience a diminution in property value ranging from ten to twenty
percent. All of these cases concern the proper valuation of the easement donated. Within
this small body of case law, four cases—Hilborn, Losch, Nicoladis, and Dorsey—are
helpful in parceling out what portion of the diminution is attributable to an easement that
does more than local regulations. Due to a dearth of analysis, the remaining two cases,
Richmond and Griffin, do not clearly articulate how the easement in question went
beyond local law but nonetheless comprise part of IRS precedent of relying on a ten
percent diminution factor.

32

See Richmond v. United States, 699 F. Supp. 578 (D. La. 1988); Dorsey v. Comm’r, 59 T.C.M. (CCH)
592 (1990); Griffin v. Comm’r, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1560 (1989); Losch v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 909
(1988); Nicoladis v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 624 (1988); Hilborn v. Comm’r, 85 T.C. 667 (1985); see
also Granger v. Comm’r, No. 87-2455-0 (D.C. Kan. 1988) (not discussed here because this case is not
illustrative of the impact of local preservation laws; the case instead focused on the issue of whether
taxpayers could recover litigation costs from the government, which the court held took a stance that was
not “substantially justified.”).
33
See discussion infra Part IV.
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Hilborn v. Commissioner
Hilborn is the first case involving an easement on a historic property and is
significant for at least two reasons. First, the opinion articulates how the extra financial
burdens incurred in donating the easement at issue went beyond local ordinances.
Second, as discussed below in Part IV, the case appears to be the origin of confusion that
there is something akin to a rule or a guaranteed factor of diminution. 34
The taxpayers were members of a partnership that acquired an office building in
New Orleans’ Vieux Carre historic district. 35 At issue in the case was not whether the
easement qualified under § 170(h), but what the value of the deduction should be. In the
Tax Court’s findings of fact, it noted that the Vieux Carre Commission’s “Façade
Easement Policy” was to apply a higher standard than what was already required of
buildings in the district; in some cases, this standard required those seeking to donate an
easement to first restore the property. 36 Indeed, the Commission made acceptance of the
donation conditional on expending $185,000, exclusive of façade repairs, to renovate the
building. 37 The partnership then entered into an easement agreement that required it to
spend an additional $47,800 to renovate the exterior façade. 38 The court agreed with the
taxpayers’ expert that the easement imposed “‘substantial additional burdens’” beyond
the existing zoning laws and the Commission’s requirements because the easement
required rehabilitation and also prevented a higher and better use of the property

34

See A PPRAISING EASEMENTS, supra note 24, at 10 (“The decision has served as a valuation benchmark
for subsequent historic preservation easement valuation cases, which generally recognized a 12 percent to
15 percent valuation differential attributable to easements.”).
35
85 T.C. at 677.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 680.
38
Id.
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attainable but for the easement’s restriction on assembling the property with a corner
lot. 39
However, although the court agreed with the taxpayers’ appraiser that the
easement created burdens more substantial than the IRS appraiser found, it nonetheless
held that those burdens were adequately reflected in the IRS appraiser’s finding of a ten
percent diminution in value. 40 The taxpayers’ appraiser told the court that his twelve
percent diminution factor was wholly subjective, while the court found that the IRS
appraiser used an objective methodology. 41

Losch v. Commissioner
Losch marked a continuation of the IRS reliance on a ten percent diminution
factor but is helpful because the opinion includes a description of how the easement,
which extended to the interior of the property, was more stringent than local law. Losch
is also significant because of the court’s comments on its institutional capacity to decide
valuation disputes. 42
Losch centered on the valuation of an easement that the Losch couple had
imposed on property located in Washington, D.C.’s Dupont Circle historic district. 43 The
easement donated was somewhat unique in that it also contained restrictions on what

39

Id. at 691.
Id. at 698.
41
Id. at 699.
42
Losch, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 921 (1988) (“At this point we feel constrained to reiterate once again our
doubts as to the efficacy of using the judicial process to resolve valuation issues… Additionally, we believe
that resolution of theses issues by settlement or other procedures short of court proceedings will often result
in a value which is fairer to both parties. The parties and their experts will generally have a fuller
knowledge of the pertinent facts and greater expertise than does this Court which must rely only on ‘a cold
record and dry briefs’ to from the basis of its conclusion.”)
43
55 T.C.M. at 910.
40
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could be done to the interior of the property; 44 with respect to control of the interior, then,
it clearly restricted more than local preservation ordinances. The taxpayers’ appraiser
concluded that part of the decline in value stemmed from a $25,000 loss of the right to
develop the property to the extent of zoning regulations and a $10,000 loss in any
potential opportunity that would become available in the future because of changes in
future zoning laws. 45
The taxpayers presented testimony from a former zoning board official and
Historic Preservation Review Board official that an additional two floors of residential
space would probably have been approved und er existing regulations. 46 Nonetheless, the
court found that the $25,000 portion of the loss was too speculative because, although the
taxpayers did account for existing regulations in calculating the before and after value of
the property, they did not offer any evidence of the economic feasibility of a two- floor
addition project. 47 In other words, the addition could not be considered the property’s
“highest and best use” because the possibility of such a project was too remote. 48
In rejecting the $10,000 diminution attributed to potential future changes in local
law, the court did nothing more than to say that the figure was too speculative. The
rejection of that figure, however, is significant because it demonstrates that however
sound the policy argument may be for encouraging perpetual easements on top of
potentially unstable local law, there is no authority suggesting that potential future
change in local laws is to be included in valuation. 49 In other words, while the

44

Id. at 912.
Id. at 914.
46
Id. at 915.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
45
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Regulations require that the easement be compared with local ordinances during the
valuation process, the comparison is for the purpose of determining whether the easement
imposes any additional restrictions on reasonably likely uses of the property—not for
ascribing an additional value for the easement’s quality of being perpetual.
When conducting the “comparable sales” analysis to determine the easement’s
value, the taxpayers’ appraiser unsurprisingly found that the imposition of an easement
did cause a noticeable diminution in value while the IRS appraiser’s comparable sales
analysis was inconclusive. 50 Nonetheless, the IRS stayed close to the ten percent figure
used in Hilborn because, despite the inconclusiveness of the comparable sales analysis,
the IRS appraiser found a ten percent diminution reasonable. 51 However, the court opted
to find a fifteen-percent diminution, through the comparable sales approach, because of
one particular comparable sale, also on New Hampshire Avenue, that supported a fifteento twenty-two-percent diminution. 52 Although the comparable sales analysis did support
finding a diminution in value, this method of analysis did not articulate what the owner
gave up as clearly as did the income capitalization method.
The IRS appraiser’s income capitalization analys is showed that, as a result of the
easement, the owners lost rental value due to the inability to install an elevator as a result
of the interior easement and increased insurance and reserve costs. 53 The court averaged
its own findings on the “comparable sales” ($116,250) and income capitalization
($143,000) methods and concluded that the easement’s value was $130,000;54 given the

50

Id. at 918.
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 921.
51

12

court’s finding that the “before” value of the property was $775,000, the taxpayers ended
up with a property value diminished by roughly seventeen percent.
Although the current use of the building was also the highest and best use, the
taxpayers in Losch nonetheless secured a substantial deduction because of the atypical
easement that extended to the interior, the favorable comparable sales analysis, and the
even more favorable income capitalization analysis. Sixteen years after Losch, a
comparison of a more typical easement donation suggests that the likely diminution in
value may often be below that won in Losch. Most easements do not grant the easement
holder control over a property’s interior and are therefore not likely to be as restrictive as
the easement in Losch.
Furthermore, because the income capitalization method of valuation does not
apply to residential property, the comparable sales analysis is the favored method of
valuation. As discussed in Part IV, there is a substantial and growing body of easements
in several areas that should make the comparable sales analysis more conclusive than it
has been in the past. 55 Given that residential property owners generally ha ve one leg to
stand on (comparable sales analysis), then such owners would deduct lower amounts or
nothing at all if comparable sales analyses show that the easements have minimal to no
impact on property value.
55

At the time of this writing, there were approximately 901 easements recorded in Washington, D.C.
(L’Enfant Trust holds 697, Foundation for the Preservation of Historic Georgetown holds 98, National
Trust holds 14, Preservation Trust holds 82, Tri-State Architectural Trust holds 10). E-mail from Carol
Go ldman, President, L’Enfant Trust (March 31, 2004, 12:15 EST) (on file with author); E-mail from Peter
Jost, Trustee, Foundation for the Preservation of Historic Georgetown (March 31, 2004, 10:02 EST) (on
file with author); E-mail from Paul Edmondson, General Counsel, National Trust (April 1, 2004, 2:27 EST)
(on file with author); E-mail from Ray Gooch, Preservation Trust (April 1, 2004, 3:04 EST) (on file with
author); Telephone Interview with Karen Leonel, Tri-State Architectural Trust (April 5, 2004). See also
A PPRAISING EASEMENTS, supra note 24, at 9 (“Since Appraising Easements was first released in 1984, a
number of easement-encumbered properties have sold or been transferred. In areas with significant
conservation easement sales data, careful appraisers incorporate such data into their appraisals, even if the
data are not sufficient to permit complete reliance on a comparable sales analysis.”).
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Nicoladis v. Commissioner
Nicoladis is yet another instance of reliance on a ten percent diminution factor—
both by the IRS appraiser and the taxpayers’ appraiser. As in Losch, the court showed its
institutional reluctance to quibble with the ten percent figure that both sides relied upon
for part of the valuation. 56
The taxpayers were members of a Louisiana partnership. 57 The property at issue
consisted of a two-and-one-half story building with attached, vacant lots. 58 Interestingly,
with respect to the building itself, both parties stuck to the ten percent figure used in
Hilborn. 59 The taxpayers took note of the Hilborn decision when they requested that their
appraiser conduct a second appraisal in light of that decision. 60
The parties diverged most clearly in their arguments regarding the difference
between the easement and the regulations that already applied to the property. 61 The
taxpayers argued that, after donating the easement, the highest and best use of the vacant
portion was as a parking lot because it had forsaken the ability to develop that lot. 62 In
contrast, the IRS appraiser argued that the taxpayer could not have developed that lot
even before donating the easement because the public was likely to object to such
development. 63 The taxpaye r won on this point because the court found that the IRS
expert only speculated about opposition while the taxpayer presented testimony from a
56

55 T.C.M. at 629 (“For lack of evidence to the contrary, we accept this figure. We will not impose our
judgment on the issue without sufficient reason to doubt the experts and evidence upon which to base our
opinion.”) See discussion infra Part IV.
57
Id. at 628.
58
Id. at 624-25.
59
Id. at 627.
60
Id. at 626.
61
Id. at 627.
62
Id.
63
Id.
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Historic District Landmark Commission representative that, prior to the easement, some
development was possible. 64 Finally, the taxpayer won an approximately fourteenpercent reduction because the IRS conceded that, with respect to the adjacent vacant lot,
there was some loss of development rights beyond the ten percent reduction. 65
There were two main factors contrib uting to the taxpayers’ success in obtaining a
fourteen percent deduction. First, the court was unwilling to look beyond the ten percent
figure upon which both sides relied. Second, the taxpayers presented testimony, rather
than speculation, that they had given up some development potential on the adjacent lot.
If taxpayers can continue to present solid evidence, such as the testimony in Nicoladis,
that development potential has been sacrificed, then they should be able to continue
claiming deductions. However, as discussed below, sixteen years after Nicoladis, there
exists the risk that a court might now have sufficient evidence to more forcefully probe
whether reliance on a ten percent figure is justified.

Richmond v. Commissioner
Richmond, which involved facts similar to Hilborn, is less illustrative of the
impact of local preservation laws for two main reasons. (1) The taxpayers presented
virtually no evidence to support their argument that they deserved a twenty-five percent
diminution in value. 66 (2) The IRS appraiser, contrary to the Hilborn and Nicoladis
insistence that valuation is a “question of facts and circumstances,” automatically granted
a ten percent reduction and also accounted for the easement’s requirements that the

64

Id. at 628.
Id. at 629.
66
699 F. Supp. 578, 580-81.
65

15

owners make extra expenditures. 67 Thus, despite what appeared to be the taxpayers’
inability to carry their burden of proof, they still secured a fifteen-percent reduction in
value.

Griffin v. Commissioner
Griffin also involved members of a Louisiana partnership who owned property in
the same “Central Business District” mentioned in Nicoladis. 68 The property consisted of
three adjacent buildings, which were classified as having experienced significant façade
changes but that nonetheless still contributed to the historic district. 69 The taxpayers
boldly argued for a fifty- three percent diminution in value, and the taxpayers’ appraiser
erroneously argued that, after the easement, the buildings had zero value. 70 The IRS and
taxpayer did not differ much regarding the “before” value. 71
Next, the IRS appraiser took the familiar step of granting a ten percent diminution
to the easement. 72 The taxpayers argued to go beyond the ten percent factor used in
Hilborn because that case involved property in the French Quarter, which imposed
tougher restrictions on property than the standard applied to their category of property in
the Central Business District; in fact, they argued that, absent the easement, they would
be able to demolish the buildings to construct a commercial office building. 73 Without
much explanation, the court agreed that there was more development potential than in the
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French Quarter and concluded that under “the totality of the evidence,” the easement
caused a twenty percent diminution in value. 74 Therefore, one half of the taxpayers’
deduction stemmed from the IRS concession that there was a ten percent diminution, and
the other half of the deduction stemmed from the court’s opaque finding that regulations
touching their property were not as strict as those imposed by the French Quarter. In
Losch and Nicoladis, taxpayers presented testimony that some development would have
been allowed absent the easement. In contrast, even if the taxpayers’ district was not as
regulated as the French Quarter, Griffin did not clearly articulate how the taxpayers had
sacrificed the ability to develop their property.

Dorsey v. Commissioner
Dorsey, the most recent case involving an easement valuation dispute in a historic
district, contains a more thorough discussion of the impact of local preservation laws and
touches similar concerns to those raised in Nicoladis. The property involved was a threestory building in New Orleans’ Picayune Place Historic District. 75 The easement covered
all of the exterior surfaces, obligated the owners to make the expenditures that the
easement holder found necessary to maintain the building’s character, and prevented
changing the use of the building regardless of whether a higher and better use was
possible. 76
Both the taxpayer and IRS agreed that, after the easement, the highest and best
use was as a three-story building. 77 However, the taxpayer argued that the highest and
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best “before” use was as a five-story building. 78 After applying the “income
capitalization” method, the taxpayer argued that the value of the easement donated was
approximately $245,000. 79 The IRS argued that the highest and best use of the “before”
building was actually the same as its current use, and then applied a ten-percent
diminution factor to arrive at an easement value of $46,000. 80 As for the highest and best
“before” use, the court agreed with the taxpayers, who presented testimony from a
Historic District Landmarks Commission member and a former director of the office of
Safety and Permits that the Commission would have approved additions and set-back
requirements probably would have been waived to add two stories to the structure. 81
However, the court then found that the taxpayer had mechanically applied the before and
after method of valuation. 82
Instead of following the taxpayers’ method, the court performed two steps to find
an easement value of approximately $153,000, which represented a thirty-three percent
diminution in value. 83 First, the court found that with respect to the loss of control over
the building’s exterior, there was no real evidence of comparable sales, and therefore it
relied on the ten percent diminution factor, which it applied only to the building itself. 84
Second, the court arrived at the square footage of development rights that was foregone
by the easement. 85 Next, it determined the percentage of the “before” space that the lost
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rights represented and multiplied that factor by the property’s value. 86 Upon combining
the exterior control loss (step one) and development rights loss (step two), the court
arrived at the figure of $153,422. 87 Although the percentage diminution was actually
greater than what the taxpayer had argued, twenty percent, the actual value was smaller
because the taxpayer’s mechanical valuation led to a substantially higher “before” value.
Similarly to Nicoladis, the taxpayers’ success here stemmed from two sources.
First, because it had no comparable sales evidence, the court relied on the ten percent
figure to determine the amount of diminution caused by the loss of control. Second, the
court gave weight to testimony that an additional two stories would have been permitted
and determined that there was also diminution because of the loss of development rights.
As discussed above in the context of Nicoladis, such testimony is undoubtedly helpful to
showing that the easement in question goes beyond local regulation. However, should
comparable sales become more determinative in the future, then reliance on a ten percent
diminution is riskier.
Hilborn, Losch, Nicoladis, and Dorsey each articulate what it is that property
owners are giving up when they donate a preservation easement. In Hilborn, it was
documented that the easement went beyond the Vieux Carre Commission’s normal
standards by, for example, requiring the owners to make extra expenditures and
preventing the assemblage of the property with a corner lot. 88 In Losch, it was clear that
the interior easement went beyond local regulations and imposed a real burden. 89 In
Nicoladis, the taxpayers presented testimony to show that they had lost some
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development rights because of the easement. 90 And in Dorsey, the taxpayers also
successfully presented testimony that they had given up valuable development rights as a
result of the easement. 91
However, Richmond provides significantly less support for the conclusion that the
easement in that case caused a fifteen percent diminution in value. Although the case
shared some facts with Hilborn, such as expenditures required by the Vieux Carre
Commission, the Richmond property was already at its highest and best use prior to the
easement, unlike in Hilborn where there was previously the potential to assemble the
property with a corner lot. 92 So while it seems that some portion of the fifteen percent is
supported by the requisite expenditures, the re is little explanation for why the IRS
decided to grant a fifteen percent diminution.
Griffin also contained an unsatisfactory explanation of why the property
warranted a twenty percent diminution, as the court concluded, or even a ten percent
diminution, as the IRS argued. 93 In these two cases, and even to some extent in cases
such as Losch, the IRS strategy was to stick to a ten percent diminution factor. Thus,
while the Tax Court highlighted that it had not established a ten percent rule in Hilborn, 94
the IRS and many taxpayers nonetheless appear to have proceeded as if there were such a
rule. 95
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF A POTENTIALLY REDUCED EASEMENT VALUE
Many easements may be overvalued when taxpayers deduct their value as
charitable donations, and therefore there is currently too much reliance on a guaranteed
minimum ten percent diminution. Nonetheless, there is a laundry list of reasons why
preservation easements are an effective historic preservation tool. Primary among these
reasons is that easements are perpetual, whereas local law is subject to change.

Cause for Concern Regarding Reliance on a Ten Percent Figure
There are several reasons to be concerned that the Nicoladis court was correct in
stating that valuation remains a question of “facts and circumstances” and that there is no
“ten percent rule.”96 Among these reasons is the lack of authority for such a rule from
legislative history, statutory authority, or case law. Furthermore, there has been a period
of relative dormancy in terms of valuation litigation, and the IRS has recently redacted
suggestions of generally appropriate diminution figures. This dormant period and
redaction lead one to wonder whether the IRS would proceed differently should more
valuation litigation occur in the future.
Beginning with the legislative history behind § 170(h), the Committee of Ways
and Means report states that “there may be instances in which the grant of an easement
may serve to enhance, rather than reduce, the value of property, and in such instances no
deduction would be allowable; for example, where there is a premium in value on

arch-trust.org/participate (last visited May 10, 2004), that I was a 35% bracket taxpayer who owned a piece
of property worth $1,000,000. The calculator then informed me that an easement would be worth
$110,000, giving me a tax savings of more than $40,000.
96
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property of a historic nature.”97 The Committee noted further that it intended that “as the
use of conservation easements increases, valuation would increasingly take into account
the selling price value, in arm’s- length transactions, of other properties burdened with
comparable restrictions.”98 In light of this legislative history, property owners may be
relying on the good graces of the IRS when it comes to expecting a ten or fifteen percent
diminution. 99 In other words, while the IRS has a track record of applying the ten percent
factor in case law, there is no statutory, legislative history, or even case law support for
the notion that an easement is sure to produce a ten percent diminution in value. Should,
as the Committee report suggests, valuation increasingly take into consideration
comparable sales of encumbered properties, then areas such as New Orleans and
Washington, D.C. have a substantial pool of such properties that can serve as a basis for
comparison. 100
Case law shows that taxpayers’ success was generally due to one of or a
combination of three factors: (1) testimony or clear evidence that reasonably likely
development rights had been given up; (2) appraisals more generally, typically using the
income capitalization method, which established a diminished property value; and (3) a
virtually automatic IRS concession of a ten percent diminution. Although case law
should clearly be a source for concluding that some percentage deduction follows from a
97
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showing that development rights have been sacrificed, property owners, especially
residential property owners, should put little stock in the other two factors. All of the
property in the six discussed cases was commercial, and as noted above, the income
capitalization method is generally inapplicable to residential property. Therefore, case
law seems to be a poor source of comfort for residential property owners—at least with
respect to any portion of diminution owing to a conclusive appraisal. After all, only in
Losch did the comparable sales analysis prove fruitful. 101
The third factor, IRS concession of a ten percent diminution, does not provide
stable footing either. If comparable sales analyses become more conclusive in the future,
then it is reasonable to expect that the IRS would not concede a ten percent diminution.
Yet even presently, there is risk in relying on a ten percent diminution because of the
dormancy in litigating preservation easement cases, the recent IRS redaction from
materials available on its website of a suggested diminution range, and also because of
courts’ institutional capacity to decide valuation cases.
It has been over fourteen years since a case involving the valuation of a
preservation easement was decided, and all of the six cases discussed here involved
easements that were conveyed between the ends of 1979 and 1981, not long after it
became clear that historic property owners could make donations of easements.
The recurring reliance on the ten percent figure appears to stem partially from an
IRS brief that formerly suggested that a ten to fifteen percent diminution in value was
appropriate. The IRS has since redacted that portion of the brief that suggested a
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generally appropriate diminution percentage. 102 However, it appears that some
organizations continue to rely on the older version of the brief. 103 Confusingly enough,
the same suggested diminution range can still be found buried in an IRS audit guide,
although this document also appears to have been modified. 104
It seems that a portion of the taxpayers’ success was due to the courts’
aboveboard institutional discomfort with resolving valuation disputes. 105 Where there was
little to support a finding of diminished value, the court would nonetheless look to the
IRS argument, which usually conceded diminution by hewing to a ten percent baseline.106
Because the IRS conceded a ten percent diminution, and the court was unlikely to reach a
finding more anti-taxpayer than what the IRS was arguing, the issue was then whether ten
percent was all that the taxpayer would get or whether there was diminution greater than
ten percent. For future valuation cases, then, this begs the question of how the court
would view the parties’ relative arguments if the IRS did not concede a ten percent
diminution.
102
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Easements as an Alternative Historic Preservation Tool
In addition to the benefit that easements are perpetual, easements produce another
benefit in the form of private policing when neighbors are given notice that property is
encumbered with an easement and when easement holders enforce their easements
against violators. 107 Of somewhat smaller benefit is the fact that easements are not prone
to attack on constitutional grounds as are ordinances. 108
As an example of easements’ staying power, consider the fate of three historic
buildings in Charleston, South Carolina. Historic Charleston Foundation owned interior
easements on three properties located close to a new federal courthouse annex. In the
wake of the Oklahoma City bombing, the General Services Administration (“GSA”)
wanted to keep the façade of the historic buildings but replace the interior structures to
increase security. After a contentious period during which Charleston’s mayor attempted
to arrange an agreement between the GSA and Historic Charleston Foundation, the GSA
finally backed down from its plans. However, just down the street, remodeling was
performed on another building for which the easement holder only held an easement on
three of the walls. 109
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V. CONCLUSION
Because easements are treated as commodities under § 170(h), a lower value
would undoubtedly result in a decline in the number of easements that are donated. A
realignment between the percentage diminution claimed in income tax deductions and the
actual, more likely lower, value of easements produces both positive and negative
effects. 110 The negative effect is that there is likely to be a decrease in the number of
donated easements. The positive effect is that a realignment stays true to the normative
reasons for granting a deduction in the first place—that a publicly- funded form of
compensation, namely a tax expenditure, ought to accurately reflect what someone has
done to protect the commons.
Yet there is some “slippage” between this concept of what is normatively
appropriate and the market value of an easement that a taxpayer is able to deduct because
the market price cannot perfectly reflect what is beneficial to the commons. Consider the
scenario where a comparable sales analys is, or any other valuation method, establishes
that an easement has no negative effect on a property’s selling price. In that scenario, the
owner will be unable to deduct anything for the donation of an easement and therefore
will be unlikely to donate the easement. However, although the easement has no value to
the owner, there is still historic preservation value in the easement because it is perpetual.
In other words, there is not a perfect match between the burden that an owner suffers via
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the reduced price that encumbered property commands in the market (i.e. before versus
after value) and the historic preservation benefits that are derived from the easement.
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APPENDIX A111

111

The valuation methodology gives the property owner two places in which to articulate that the easement
goes beyond local regulations. First, although not required, the owner can show that before imposing the
easement, the property could have reasonably been put to a higher and better use. Second, the owner must
show that the easement has restricted use of the property in a way that goes beyond preexisting local
ordinances. Therefore, the disparity in effect between existing regulations and a donated easement is
starkest in those cases where not only is the owner, post-easement, more restricted in his use of the
property, but where that owner had not yet put the property to its “highest and best” use prior to the
easement.
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